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Security System from Pay as 
You Go to Actuarially Fair 
Tatsuo Hatta and Noriyoshi Oguchi 
The current Japanese public pension  system is essentially pay  as you  go; 
hence, its rate of return is not actuarially fair for each participant. This is the 
root of the three problems that the Japanese public pension system faces. 
First,  the  system transfers income intergenerationally. In  particular,  the 
generation following the baby boomers is expected to make a large transfer to 
the baby boomer generation. By the year 2025, the average Japanese worker 
will have to support twice as many retirees as in 1990. This period, which is 
characterized by  a higher percentage of  retirees, will be referred to in this 
paper as the high-average-age period (HAAP). The arrival of the HAAP will 
increase the required social security contributions to maintain the promised 
benefits resulting in significant income redistributions among different gener- 
ations. It may even make the very  existence of  the public pension system 
uncertain. 
Second, the system also transfers income within each generation in a way 
that is difficult to justify. For example, the nonworking wife of  a corporate 
president typically gets a much higher rate of return on her pension benefits 
than a worker of that company who never marries. 
Third, since the social security contribution is not directly linked to the 
future benefit payments, the current system distorts the labor supply. 
Had the system been actuarially fair from the beginning, these problems 
would not have arisen. Once a pay-as-you-go system is in  place, however, 
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making it actuarially fair may create new problems. The principal aim of the 
present paper is to evaluate the economic effects of various reform plans that 
would eventually make the system actuarially fair. 
Specifically, we examine the following three plans. 
1. Switch to the Fully Funded System. This quickly increases the government 
budget surplus to the level of  social security wealth before the arrival of 
the HAAP. 
2. Switch to the Actuarially Fair System. This switches the system over to an 
actuarially  fair  one before  the  HAAP.  People  in  the  baby  boomer  and 
subsequent  generations  will contribute  the  amount that exactly matches 
benefits received. The cumulative budget surplus never reaches the level 
of the social security wealth; the system never becomes fully funded. 
3. Gradual Shqt to the Fully Funded System. After an actuarially fair system 
is established as in plan 2, several generations pay taxes at levels greater 
than the actuarially fair amount until the system is eventually made fully 
funded. The burdens of building up the fund are shared by  several gener- 
ations. 
Note that plan 3 contains the other two plans as special cases: plan 3 degener- 
ates into plan  1 if  it takes only one generation to build up the full fund and 
into plan 2 if  it takes an infinite number of generations. For discussion pur- 
poses,  we will consider as plan 3 the reform whereby  five generations after 
the baby boomers equally share the burden of building up the full fund. We 
will study the economic effects of these reform plans on intergenerational  in- 
come transfers,  national saving, and government surplus using the simplest 
possible overlapping generation model that incorporates the HAAP. 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff’s (1984, 1985, 1987) pioneering work studies var- 
ious  economic  effects of  reforming  a social  security  system in the  face of 
demographic changes. Their empirical simulation model incorporates produc- 
tion function and realistic demographic changes. Honma, Atoda, and Otake 
(1988) and Otake (1989) also develop such models for the Japanese economy. 
Noguchi (1987a, 1987b) presents a model that is more abstract in production 
than these others but one that still assumes substitution between factors. We, 
on the other hand, employ a simulation model that abstracts from reality to an 
extreme degree. For example, per capita output level is fixed, the interest is 
1, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1984, 1985, 1987) examine the economic effects of plan 1 for the 
U.S. economy. Plan 2 is similar to Boskin, Kotlikoff, and Shoven’s (1985) reform proposal for 
the United States. It is also similar to Tsukahara’s (1989) “modified pay-as-you-go plan” and 
Honma, Atoda, and Otake’s (1988) and Otake’s (1989) “switch to the fully funded.” Tsukahara’s 
plan, which essentially preserves the features of the pay-as-you-go system, does not solve the 
problems of  intragenerational distribution and labor disincentives.  But his plan and our plan 2 
yield identical economic effects on intergenerational distribution,  national saving, and budget 
deficit. Honma, Atoda, and Otake (1988) and Otake (1988) assume that the pension participants 
do not realize the link between the social security tax and the benefit; hence, even intergenera- 
tional distributional effects are quite different from our plan 2. Hatta (1988) and Hatta and Oguchi 
(1989a. 1989b) propose plan 3. 209  Public Pension Reform 
given by the foreign country, and consumers have Cobb-Douglas utility func- 
tions. There are three purposes for this abstraction. 
First, our model isolates the effects of the arrival of the HAAP under vari- 
ous public pension plans. Thus, it brings to the surface the common patterns 
of  interactions between the HAAP and public pension plans underlying the 
various models constructed for both the Japanese and the U.S.  economies. 
Also, it produces qualitative results associated with pension systems thus far 
found only through complicated models, such as Auerbach et al.’s (1989) ob- 
servations that  a pay-as-you-go system creates a positive  saving after the 
HAAP. 
Second, our model brings out sharply the qualitative differences in the eco- 
nomic effects between immediately building up the social security fund and 
merely making the system an actuarially fair but unfunded one. 
Third, our model enables us readily to analyze the net government transfer 
to the private sector created by different public pension systems. In particular, 
we will give an institutional framework where the government net transfer to 
the private sector is represented by an increase in the balance of a government 
bond. It will be shown that the government could attain exactly the same eco- 
nomic effects as our reform plans 2 and 3 by taking the following steps: (a) 
issuing a government bond, to be called the “liquidation bond,” that pays off 
the pension benefits of the retired at the time of reform; (b) immediately estab- 
lishing the pension funds for subsequent generations; and (c) possibly redeem- 
ing the bond by increasing tax rates on subsequent generations. 
After a brief review in section 7.1 of the policy issues associated with the 
Japanese social security system, we present the model and compare the eco- 
nomic effects of adapting a pay-as-you-go and a fully funded system in section 
7.2. Section 7.3 discusses the effects of reforming the social security system. 
Section 7.4 in turn examines the effects of the reform plans on the cumulative 
government transfer to the private sector, and section 7.5 explores the public 
pension fund as an accounting concept. Concluding remarks are given in sec- 
tion 7.6. 
7.1  Issues in the Japanese Public Pension System 
In this section, we  describe the public pension system in Japan and the 
policy issues associated with it. 
7.1.1  The Public Pension System of Japan 
Japan has three major public pension systems: 
a) the private-sector-employee pension system; 
b)  the government-employee pension system; and 
c)  people’s pension system. 
The first two systems share similar structures in that both have two benefit 
components: the basic pension benefits and the earnings-related pension ben- 210  Tatsuo Hatta and Noriyoshi Oguchi 
efits. The former component yields benefits solely on the basis of  years of 
participation; it does not reflect the participant’s earnings. 
Anyone who is not covered by the first two pension systems is required to 
join the people’s pension system. This provides benefits identical to those of 
the basic pension component of  the first two systems. The required contri- 
bution for the people’s pension system isY8,400 ($60) per month per person. 
In the employee pension systems, all the benefit payments including the basic 
pension benefit are financed by  the earnings-related social security taxes as 
well as by  the government subsidies. In March 1990, the social security tax 
rate for the private-sector-employee pension system was 14.3 percent of the 
“standard monthly earnings” for men and 13.8 percent for women. 
The basic pension benefit for a participant of forty years isY55,500 ($400) 
per month, and benefit payments start at age 65. Payments for the private- 
sector-employee pension systems start at age 60 for men and 58 for women. 
The three pension systems are subsidized by the General Account of the gov- 
ernment budget,  which is financed by  non-social  security taxes. All three 
systems can be considered virtually pay-as-you-go systems. Indeed, Ueda, 
Iwai, and Hashimoto (1987) estimate that, for a household headed by  a 60- 
year-old in 1985, the percentage of  a government transfer in pension benefits 
is 87 percent for the private-sector system and 85 percent for the people’s 
pension. 
The postwar Japanese public pension systems were established in  1954, 
overhauling the  then  existing  systems. The  new  systems were essentially 
fully funded at the beginning. As time passed, however, benefits were raised 
more than contributions, and they became less and less fully funded. This 
tendency toward a pay-as-you-go system became entrenched by the reform in 
1973, which introduced indexation and  set the replacement ratio to be  60 
percent for an average earner. It was carried out under the extreme optimism 
of a pre-OPEC high-growth period. 
7.1.2  Intergenerational Redistribution 
When a more modest growth rate is expected, maintaining a replacement 
ratio of 60 percent will cause a rapid depletion of the accumulated fund. Since 
a sharp demographic change is expected in Japan, this will entail a heavy 
burden on the working-age generation as the percentage of the retired popu- 
lation increases. 
As figure 7.1 shows, the ratio of  those people 65 years of  age or older to 
the total population stayed constant until the mid-1950s but has risen sharply 
since then. This ratio is expected to rise until approximately 2025. In fact, it 
is predicted that it will double in only twenty-six years in Japan, whereas it 
took 115 years in France, eighty-five years in Sweden and forty-five years in 
the United Kingdom and West Germany for this ratio to increase from 7 to 14 
percent. This steep increase in the proportion of aged people reflects a signif- 
icant decline in the mortality rate during the postwar period and a sharp rise 
in the birth rate immediately after the war. 211  Public Pension Reform 
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Fig. 7.1 
Source: Institute of  Demographic Studies, Ministry of Welfare, Demographic Srarisrics (1986). 
The percentage of those 65 years old or older to the total population 
Figure  7.2  shows  the  age-based  demographic  composition  of  Japan  in 
1985. We  see a relatively  high concentration of the population  between  the 
ages of  35 and 60, including a bulge at ages 35-40  that reflects the post- 
war baby boom. Under a pay-as-you-go  system, this demographic structure 
will  cause large income transfers from the post-baby  boomers to the baby 
boomers. 
7.1.3  Intragenerational Redistribution 
The Japanese pension systems redistribute income not only among different 
generations but also within each generation. Although a certain limited equal- 
ization of income within a generation occurs, income is also redistributed  in 
directions that are difficult to justify: 
1.  From the wives of  the self-employed to the nonworking wives of  the em- 
ployed, The wife of a self-employed person has to join the people's  pen- 
sion and make social security contributions in order to receive basic pen- 
sion benefits in the future. The nonworking wife of the employed person 
can receive the same benefits without any additional contributions made 
either by herself or by her husband. 
2.  From  unmarried  employees  to nonworking wives of  employees.  A  non- 
working wife of an employee receives the following from her husband's 
employee  pension  system:  (a) survivors'  benefits  if  the  husband  dies; 
and  (b) basic  pension  benefits.  Despite  these  additional  benefits  given 
to  the  wife,  her  husband's  social  security  contribution  stays  the  same 
regardless of his marital status. The rate of return on public pension that 
a  nonworking  wife  of  a  company  president  receives  is  much  higher 
than that of a worker of the same company who stays single for her entire 
life. 212  Tatsuo Hatta and Noriyoshi Oguchi 
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Fig. 7.2  Japan’s demographic composition by age 
Source: Ministry of Welfare, Nihon no Jinkou-Nihon  no Shukui (Demography of Japan- 
Society of Japan) Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha Press, 1988, 104. 
3. From  the  working wives  of  employees to the  nonworking  wives  of  em- 
ployees. When the husband of  a working wife dies,  she has to choose 
between receiving benefits from her own employee pension or survivors’ 
benefits  from  her  husband’s pension.  She  cannot  receive both.  If  she 
chooses the former,  she cannot enjoy the benefits that  all nonworking 
wives receive. If  she chooses the latter, she wastes the contributions she 
has made to her own pension program. 
The rate of return on the current pension system is not linked to the market 
rate of  return. Because of  this, it is hard for an individual to estimate how 
much net benefit or loss he or she receives from the public pension system. 
This creates a situation where political forces tend to dominate the direction 
of redistribution. This seems to be the reason why the Japanese pension sys- 
tem has erratic income transfers. 
7.1.4  Policy Issues 
To  sum up the arguments so far, the Japanese social security system is es- 
sentially pay as you go rather than actuarially fair, and this fact is the source 
of the dual problems of inter- and intragenerational redistribution the system 
has. This fact also creates two other well-known problems. 
First, the pay-as-you-go system distorts labor supply. The participant in this 
system perceives the social security contribution as a tax  since there is no 
clear-cut link between future benefits and the amount of the contribution he 
makes now. The Japanese system especially discourages housewives’ partici- 213  Public Pension Reform 
pation in full-time employment. On the other hand, an actuarially fair social 
security system does not distort labor supply. An actuarially fair system gives 
the same rate of return as the market return. Thus, a contributor will perceive 
the contribution as his own saving and hence as a part of his own income. 
Second, the  pay-as-you-go  system  reduces  the  cumulative  saving  of  an 
economy since people will reduce their saving for retirement when the bene- 
fits are guaranteed in the future. If the government has increased its saving by 
the amount that individuals have reduced private saving, then national saving 
will  not  be affected.  Under the  pay-as-you-go  system,  however, the  social 
security contribution will be used up for the benefit payments to the current 
recipients,  and the government will maintain,  not increase,  its saving. The 
pay-as-you-go system, therefore, reduces national saving. 
These problems would not have arisen had the system been actuarially fair.2 
7.2  Basic Pension Systems 
In this section, we formally analyze the effects of introducing a pay-as-you- 
go public pension system and compare them with these of introducing a fully 
funded system. We will focus particularly on the effects on intergenerational 
redistribution, national saving, and budget surplus. 
7.2.1  The Model 
The Japanese social security system is characterized by the relatively recent 
implementation of  a pay-as-you-go  system and a rapidly  increasing  propor- 
tion of  aged people.  In this section, we present the simplest possible model 
that captures these characteristics. 
Consider a two-period life-cycle model, where the working period and the 
retirement period are of equal length. There are an infinite number of genera- 
tions, but we focus on ten, which we refer to as 0-IX.  Among them, genera- 
tion 111 is the baby boom generation; we assume that its population consists of 
two people,  while all other generations contain one person.  In each period, 
the generation in its working age and another in its retirement live concur- 
rently. Figure 7.3  depicts the population size of each generation in each pe- 
riod. The horizontal axis measures the period and the vertical axis the gener- 
ations. The white boxes show the size of the working-age population  and the 
shaded boxes the size of the population in retirement. 
In interpreting this model in the context of the Japanese economy, we regard 
the working ages to be 40-59  and the retirement ages to be 60-79.  The former 
may be partially justified because the wage profile rises steeply in the Japanese 
seniority system. In view of figure 7.2, it is possible to regard generation I as 
2. The U.S. Social Security system shares many of these problems, as pointed out by Kotlikoff 
1987). An important difference between the Japanese and the U.S. systems is that there is little 
penalty for working in the Japanese system. 214  Tatsuo Hatta and Noriyoshi Oguchi 
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Fig. 7.3  Demographic composition 
born between 1900 and 1919, generation I1 between 1920 and 1939, genera- 
tion I11 between 1940 and 1959, and generation IV between 1960 and 1979. 
We  assume that one worker produces ten units of output when he is young 
but does not work in old age. Accordingly, we have 
(1)  Y,  = lON,, 
where Y,  is the output level of the economy and N, the population size of the 
working generation in period t. 
We  further assume that an individual saves half his expected lifetime dis- 
posable  income when  he  is  young  and  dissaves it  when  he retires.  (This 
amounts to assuming a Cobb-Douglas utility function.) The interest rate is 
assumed to be zero. The government has no expenditures other than pensions, 
and there are no taxes other than the social security tax. Taxes are imposed 
only on the working generation of  the period. There are no inheritances or 
bequests. Thus, the aggregate budget equation for the working generation in 
period t is written as 
(2)  C: = q+,  = (Y, + B,,,  - T,)/2, 
where C; is the aggregate consumption level of  the working generation in 
period t, q,  I  is that of  the retired generation in  period t  + 1, B,,,  is the 
public pension benefit that the retired generation in period t  + 1 receives, and 
T,  is the tax that the working generation pays in period t. 
When no public pension system exists,  a person in any generation con- 
sumes five units during his working years and another five units during his 
retirement years. The consumption of any person in any period is equal. De- 
fine national saving, S,, by 
(3) 
There is no investment in this economy, and the macro saving gap is adjusted 
by  the balance of trade. Positive national saving implies a surplus in the bal- 
ance of payments, while positive cumulative national saving implies a posi- 
tive net foreign asset position. 
Once N,, B,+l,  and T, are given, equation (1) determines the output level, 
(2) the consumption levels, and (3) the national saving. 
S,  = Y, - c; - q. 215  Public Pension Reform 
7.2.2  Intergenerational Redistribution 
social security tax that a working person pays. Then by definition we obtain 
(4)  TI = T,N, 
Let b, be the social security benefit one retiree receives in period t and 7, the 
and 
(5)  B, = b,N,-, 
The net benejit or net transfer that a working person in period t receives during 
his lifetime, g[t],  is given by 
g[tI  = b,,, -  7,. 
Throughout the paper we assume that b, = b holds if the pension benefit is 
paid in period t.  Thus, we have 
g[t] = b -  7,. 
A Fully Funded System 
introduced. By definition we have 
Now  suppose that in  period  2 an actuarially fair public pension system is 
(6)  B,,,  = T,,  t > 1, 
and, hence, 
b = T,,  t > 1. 
This pension  will not affect the consumption pattern of any generation and, 
hence, will not redistribute income among generations. 
When a pension system is actuarially fair from the beginning of its estab- 
lishment, the system has a cumulative budget surplus equal to the social se- 
curity wealth, as we will see in section 7.2.4 below. Hence, we will call this 
system  fully  funded. 
A Pay-as-You-Go System 
Now suppose that the pay-as-you-go system is implemented in period 2. By 
definition, the benefits are financed by  the social security taxes paid by the 
currently working generation. Thus, 
(7)  B, = T,,  t>  1. 
This yields 
7, = 0 
and 
bN,-, = 7,NI,  t > 1. 216  Tatsuo Hatta and Noriyoshi Oguchi 
Thus, the net benefit of each generation can be written as 
and 
gill = b 
g[t] = b(1 -  N,-,/NJ,  t > 1 
After the system is introduced, therefore, the net benefit of the working gen- 
eration in a given period is positive if and only if the population of the retired 
generation in the same period is smaller than its own. 
Figure 7.4 depicts per capita pension benefits received, contributions, and 
net benefits  of each generation  under the  assumption  that b = 4. (We will 
make this assumption in all subsequent figures.) The benefits are shown as a 
positive number and contributions as a negative number; if the net benefit line 
is above (below) the horizontal axis for a generation, it receives a net benefit 
(loss). 
The figure reveals two features of a pay-as-you-go  system. First, the intro- 
duction of the system increases the sum of consumption of all generations. 
Figure 7.4 shows that the net benefit of generation  111 is equal to the net loss 
of  generation IV since the population  size of  the former is twice the latter. 
Hence, the economy as a whole gains by the net benefit of generation I, that 
is, by  four.  Thus, the  introduction of a pay-as-you-go system creates a net 
increase in the consumption for the economy as a whole. 
Second, an introduction of the pay-as-you-go system creates income ineq- 
uity among generations, as observed earlier. Generation I, which is in retire- 
ment when the pension system is introduced,  receives  the most net benefits 
from the system. The baby boomers receive net benefits to some extent be- 
cause the tax rate they face when young is low. Generation IV, which comes 
immediately after the baby  boom generation,  receives  negative net benefits 
because it has to support the retired baby boomers. 
7.2.3  National Saving 
relation in the face of demographic changes. 
Public pension  systems affect national  saving. We  now turn to study this 
Per  capita  benefit  received 
Per capita net  benefit 
mmmrrIxx  ,,,,, 
Per copito  contribution 
SCCL 
I8  I 
Generations 
Fig. 7.4  Net benefits under the pay-as-you-go system 217  Public Pension Reform 
Even in the absence of  a public  pension  system,  fluctuations in  demo- 
graphic composition can cause national  saving to vary  each period in  our 
model, where the per capita saving of  each generation is kept constant. In- 
deed, from (l),  (3), (5),  and (6), we have 
The national saving is therefore positive (negative) if  the population size of 
the working generation is greater (less) than that of the retired generation. 
The thick line of figure 7.5a shows the fluctuations of national saving when 
a public pension system is unavailable. The level of  national saving reaches 
its peak in period 3, when the baby boomers are of  working age, while it 
reaches its bottom in period 4, when a large number of  baby boomers are 
dissaving  . 
The thick line in figure 7.5b shows the cumulative balance of national sav- 
ing when a public pension system is unavailable. The balance is positive when 
the baby boomers are of  working age; it reaches zero when they are retired 
and remains zero afterward. 
A Fully Funded System 
As previously observed, the introduction of an actuarially fair pension sys- 
tem does not affect the consumption patterns of  any generation and, hence, 
does not affect national saving in any period. 
A Pay-as-You-Go System 
however, does affect consumption patterns and therefore national saving. 
riod, which yields 
The introduction of  a pay-as-you-go public pension system in  period  2, 
The retired in period 2 will consume all the unexpected benefit in this pe- 
1 
2  C; = -Y,  + B,. 
Also, from (2)  and (3) we have 
(8)  C; = c+,  = (Y, + B,,, -  B,)/2,  t > 1. 
In view of (3),  (l),  and (5),  therefore, we have the following: 
3. As fig. 7.5a shows, the post-HAAP dissaving occurs regardless of the pension system. Ho- 
rioka (1989), using a saving function based on international cross-sectional data of demographic 
compositions and saving ratios, predicts that Japanese private saving will become negative after 
2012, when the ratio of  retirees to working-aged people becomes high. Fukao and Doi (1985), 
Noguchi (1987a), and Auerbach et al. (1989) also obtain similar predictions. 218  Tatsuo Hatta and Noriyoshi Oguchi 
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b 
2  S,  = 5(N2  -  N,)  -  -(N2  + Nl), 
Thus, national saving in a given period is influenced by the population size of 
the current and possibly two preceding generations. 
The thin  line in figure 7.5a indicates  the fluctuations of  national  saving 
under the pay-as-you-go public pension system. The graph has two troughs 219  Public Pension Reform 
and two peaks.  The first peak in period  3, which immediately precedes the 
HAAP, is lower than under the fully funded system. The positive saving in the 
second peak in period 5, which is immediately after the HAAP, did not exist 
under the fully funded system. Two factors explain these features. 
The first relates to the consumption surge by generation I in period 2, which 
receives the unexpected free-ride benefits from the newly started social secu- 
rity system. This creates a negative saving balance in the second period. If the 
population size did not change thereafter, national saving in each period after 
period 2 would remain zero permanently. 
The second relates to the existence of the baby boomers, or generation 111. 
In period 3,  the baby boomers, who are then in their working years, consume 
more under the pay-as-you-go system than under the fully funded system be- 
cause they receive positive net benefits during their lifetime. This is the reason 
why national saving is smaller under the pay-as-you-go system than under the 
fully funded system. Moreover,  national saving in period 5, which is imme- 
diately after the HAAP, is positive because the post-baby  boomer generation, 
with reduced per capita lifetime disposable income, is dissaving in this period 
at a lower rate than under the fully funded system. This was called the “over- 
shooting” of saving by Auerbach et al. (1989). 
The thin line in figure 7.5b indicates that the negative cumulative balance 
of savings in period 2 is created by generation I, as we have already discussed. 
The balance fluctuates during periods 3 and 4, when baby boomers work and 
retire.  In period  5, when  the  baby  boomers have disappeared,  the  savings 
balance returns to its original level and remains constant.  Even if  the baby 
boomer generation  did not exist and the population remained constant,  the 
negative cumulative balance of savings created in period 2 would remain per- 
manently. Thus, the influence of the baby boomers on the cumulative balance 
of savings is transitory; the cumulative balance returns to the pre-baby  boom 
level when the economy returns to the steady state. 
In sum, the introduction of a pay-as-you-go  public pension system imme- 
diately creates a negative national  saving balance,  which is carried forward 
permanently.  On the other hand, the saving fluctuations caused by the baby 
boomers eventually die out and, therefore, have no long run effect. 
We pointed out in section 7.2.2 that the introduction of the pay-as-you-go 
system increases the sum of the consumption of all generations by the amount 
of  the net benefits  received  by  the first generation.  The introduction  of  the 
pay-as-you-go system also creates the negative cumulative balance of savings 
to be carried forward to future generations by the amount that is exactly equal 
to the net benefits to the first generation.  In other words, the “consumption 
increase” caused by the pay-as-you-go system is made possible by a reduction 
in the cumulative saving; the apparent welfare improvement  is a result of  a 
Ponzi game. A correct evaluation of the welfare increase must be based on a 
combined consideration of the utility increase and the change in the cumula- 
tive saving, which embodies the potential utility. 220  Tatsuo Hatta and Noriyoshi Oguchi 
7.2.4  Budget Surplus 
The government budget surplus and deficit created by a public pension sys- 
Define the government budget surplus, Sf, by 
tem rightly or wrongly have attracted public attenti~n.~ 
(9)  Sf  = T, -  B,. 
Assuming that there was no public pension system until t = 0, we can write 
the cumulative budget surplus, Zf, as 
When there is no public pension system, T, = B,  = 0 holds; hence, the 
yearly and cumulative budget surpluses are zero in any period. 
A Fully Funded System 
A social security system may be called actuarially fair in period t if it satis- 
fies (6) for a given t. It may be calledfullyfunded in period t if the cumulative 
budget surplus is equal to the social security wealth, that is, if it satisfies 
for a given t. Note that, in general, a system satisfying (6) in period t does not 
necessarily satisfy (1  1) for the same t if 
Sf # 0  for some j < t. 
Thus, a system that happens to be  actuarially fair in  a given period is not 
necessarily fully funded in the same period. 
Suppose that an actuarially fair pension system is introduced in period 2 in 
the same manner as before. Then (6) holds for all t > 1. This and (9) yield 
for all t > 1. Thus, the relative population size of  the working and retired 
generations determines the budget surplus. 
The thin line in figure 7.6a shows the budget surplus under this system. It 
indicates that government saving is positive in period 2, when the system is 
introduced, since no benefits are paid out in that period. It is also positive in 
period 3, when the baby boomers are in  their working ages, because their 
contributions exceed the amount of benefits being paid out. Government sav- 
ing  turns negative in  period 4, however, since the retirees outnumber the 
young. It remains zero thereafter. 
Equations (10) and (1  2) imply that 
4. The definition of  budget surplus in the presence of a public pension system is arbitrary, as 
Kotlikoff (1986, 1988, 1989) has emphasized. 221  Public Pension Reform 
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Fig. 7.6b  Cumulative budget surplus after reforms. 
zg  = z;(Bj+, -  B,) 
= B,,, -  B2 
for all t > 1. Noting that B, = 0, we have (1  1) for all t > 1. If a social se- 
curity system is actuarially fair in every period of its existence, therefore, it is 
also fully funded in each of these periods. 
The thin line in figure 7.6b indicates the cumulative balance of the budget 
surplus under the fully funded system. It reaches its peak in period 3, when 
the baby boomers are in their working years, and returns to a steady-state level 
of four in period 4, when they retire.  Under the fully funded system, there- 
fore, the government will never have to borrow. 
Despite the cumulative budget surplus it creates, the introduction of an ac- 
tuarially fair pension system has no influence on the saving of the economy as 222  Tatsuo Hatta and Noriyoshi Oguchi 
a whole, as we have seen earlier. The positive government saving created by 
this system is exactly offset by the reduced saving by the consumers. 
A Pay-as-You-Go System 
budget surplus is always zero, and we have 
If the pay-as-you-go system is introduced in period 2, from (9) and (3), the 
(13)  s;  = 0,  t > 1. 
This and (10) yield 
z;  = 0,  t > 1. 
The introduction of a pay-as-you-go pension system in an economy where no 
public pension system existed, therefore, does not affect the level of the cu- 
mulative  budget  surplus.  This contrasts with  our earlier observation  that it 
affects the cumulative balance of national saving. 
7.2.5  Summary 
The observations in this section may be summarized as follows. First, in 
the absence of a public pension system, a positive cumulative balance of na- 
tional saving is created when the baby boomers are of working age. But the 
cumulative balance returns to zero in the HAAP and afterward. 
Second, an introduction of a fully funded system does not affect consump- 
tion patterns of any generation. Hence, it causes no intergenerational transfer 
of income. Nor does it affect the national saving in any periods. However, the 
introduction does create a positive cumulative balance of government budget 
surplus, or government saving. This is consistent with the fact that the intro- 
duction does not affect the national saving; the cumulative balance of private 
saving is reduced exactly to offset the budget surplus of the government. 
Third, an introduction of a pay-as-you-go system creates a negative cumu- 
lative balance of national saving, which is permanently carried forward. Also, 
it creates income inequity among generations: it benefits the first and the baby 
boomer generations, while a net burden is borne by the generation that comes 
immediately after the baby boomers. Moreover, the introduction increases the 
sum of the present value of consumption of all generations while reducing the 
cumulative balance of  saving at the steady state by exactly the same amount. 
Thus, an introduction of a pay-as-you-go system creates income inequality 
among generations,  but it does not create efficiency gain or loss within this 
model. If the model is expanded to incorporate elastic labor supply, then the 
price distortions created by the pay-as-you-go system will cause inefficiency 
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7.3  Evaluation of the Reform Plans 
7.3.1  Overview 
As we have seen in the previous two sections, if  an actuarially fair system 
had  been implemented from the beginning, it would not  have  caused such 
microeconomic problems associated with a pay-as-you-go system as inter- 
and intragenerational redistribution and labor supply disincentives. 
Let us now assume that a pay-as-you-go system was introduced in period 2 
and that the system is reformed in  period 3 in  order to attain an actuarial 
fairness eventually. Specifically, we will consider the effects of  the three re- 
form plans outlined above on intergenerational distribution, national saving, 
and government budget surplus. 
7.3.2  Economic Effects 
Switch to the Fully Funded 
Let us first consider the reform that makes the system fully funded in period 
3 and afterward, which we will call a switch to the fully funded. The reform 
will be attained by (a) raising the tax rate on generation I11 so as to finance not 
only the current benefit payment for generation I1 but also the future benefit 
payment for generation I11 and (b) imposing taxes on generation IV and sub- 
sequent generations by  the amount equal to the benefits received. Thus, the 
taxes and benefits satisfy the following:’ 
T, = B, + B,, 
T, = B,,,,  t > 3. 
Equations (15) imply that the per capita tax rates after the reform are 
7,  = b + bl2, 
T, = b,  t > 3. 
The chain line in figure 7.7 depicts the net benefits of  each generation after 
the switch to the fully funded. Generation IV and all subsequent generations 
receive zero net benefits. But the switch turns the net benefit of generation I11 
from positive to negative. 
The switch to the fully funded gives a rattle to the macroeconomic balance 
of period 3. The chain line in  figure 7.8a shows this.6 When the system is 
switched in period 3, national saving reaches a peak of seven, exceeding the 
5. Since the system is made fully funded, (1  1) holds for all t > 2. In particular, Z!  = B,.  Since 
6. From (8),  we have C; = 5. From (l), (2), and (15),  we attain C; =  = (20 -  4)/2 = 
Thus, from(3), weobtainS,  = 20 - 13 = 
Zj = 0, we have Sg  = B,.  On the other hand, equations (9) and (10) yield T, = B, + B,. 
8 and  = c+,  = (10 - 0)/2 = 5 for 3 < r. 
7,S,  = 10 - 13 =  -3,andS,  = Ofor4 < t. 224  Tatsuo Hatta and Noriyoshi Oguchi 
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Fig. 7.8a  National saving after reforms 
level under the fully funded system. This is because the baby boomers now 
have to save more than they need for their own retirement. As the chain line 
in figure 7.8b depicts, the cumulative balance of national saving is no longer 
negative in period 4 and afterward. 
The chain line in figure 7.6b shows that in period 3 the cumulative budget 
surplus becomes equal to the size of the social security wealth. The switch 
gives a wild fluctuation in government budget, as illustrated by the chain line 
in figure 7.6a.’ It soars to eight in period 3, plummets to minus four in period 
4, and then returns to zero after that period. 
7. From (15) and (9), we have Sg  = (B4 + 4) -  B, = 8, .S$  = B, -  B, =  -4,  and S;  = 
B,,, -  B, = 0  for r > 4. 225  Public Pension Reform 
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Fig. 7.8b  Cumulative national savings after reforms 
Even though the problems of  the Japanese public pension system pointed 
out earlier will disappear in the HAAP and afterward, this reform is politically 
difficult to accomplish. First, it puts a large burden on the baby boom genera- 
tion-the  working and the decision-making generation when the switch is 
made. Second, it will have the destabilizing macro effect in the HAAP. 
Switch to the Actuarially Fair System 
The system can be made actuarially fair without being accompanied by the 
shortcomings  that the switch to the fully funded causes. 
Let us assume that the pay-as-you-go system is switched to an actuarially 
fair one in period 3. This reform will be attained by making the tax rate on 
generation I11  and subsequent generations exactly equal to the present value 
of the benefit each of them receives. Thus, we have (6) for all t -  2; hence, 
(17)  t, = B,,,,  t 13. 
This implies that the per capita tax rates after the reform are 
7,  = b,  t? 2. 
We  will call this reform a switch to an actuariallyfair system. Generation I11 
faces a higher tax rate after the reform under this system than under the pay- 
as-you-go system. 
The horizontal axis in figure 7.7 depicts the net benefits of each generation 
after this reform. Generation I11  and all subsequent generations receive zero 
net benefit. Thus, intergenerational income inequity is eliminated after the 
reform. 
In period 3 and afterward, national saving is equal to the level that would 
be attained if the system were actuarially fair from the beginning, as the thick 
line in figure 7.8a depicts. (Compare this and the thick line in fig. 7.5a.) This 226  Tatsuo Hatta and Noriyoshi Oguchi 
is natural for period 4 and afterward, when both working and retired genera- 
tions live only under the actuarially fair system. But it also holds in period 3 
since the then retired, who have paid social security tax under the pay-as-you- 
go system, happen to consume the same level as when the system was actuari- 
ally fair from the beginning. As the thick line in figure 7.6b indicates, the 
cumulative budget surplus will be zero after period 4; the system will never be 
made fully funded by this reform. 
The switch to an actuarially fair system has advantages that the switch to a 
fully funded one does not have. The net benefit of generation I11 is no longer 
negative, and the national saving in period 3 is lower. This reform has the 
merits of an actuarially fair system without the side effects of the switch to the 
fully funded. 
Gradual Shift  to the Fully Funded System 
From the macroeconomic viewpoint, there is a difference between the fully 
funded system and the merely actuarially fair system discussed above; the 
cumulative balance of national saving is zero in the former when the steady 
state is reached, while it remains negative in the latter. In some situations, 
because of the macroeconomic considerations it may be necessary to make the 
system fully funded eventually. The following gradual reform would do this 
without causing the turbulence associated with the switch to the fully funded: 
First, switch the system to actuarially fair in period 3. 
Then impose taxes on several generations subsequent to the baby boomers 
at rates higher than the actuarially fair level of the expected social security 
benefits in order to build up the cumulative budget surplus. This process 
would continue until the system is made fully funded. We  will call that 
portion of taxes paid by a generation in excess of the actuarially fair level 
of  the expected benefit the pension  surtax of  the generation.8 Thus the 
several generations after the baby  boom generation pay  actuarially fair 
taxes plus pension surtaxes. 
After the system becomes fully funded, the pension surtaxes are elimi- 
nated, and the system returns to actuarially fair. 
To  make the proposal concrete, we assume that a pension surtax of 0.8 is 
imposed on each person in generations IV-VIII  so as to make the cumulative 
budget surplus in period 9 exactly equal to social security wealth. Thus, taxes 
after the reform may be written as 
T3 = B,, 
(18)  T, = B,,,  + .8N,, 
T, = B,+,,  8 < t. 
3 < t < 9, 
8. In the context of  this reform, there are no unexpected benefits, and the pension surtax is 
equal to the difference between the tax payments and the total benefit receipts of  the generation 
concerned. Thus, the pension surtax is equal to the negative of the net pension benefit received by 
the generation in this case. 227  Public Pension Reform 
The corresponding per capita tax rates are 
T~ = b, 
T, = b+ -8, 
T, = b, 
3 < t < 9, 
8 < t. 
We will call this reform gradual shy?  tofully  funded. 
Intergenerational Redistribution. The dashed line in figure 7.7 depicts the net 
benefits of each generation under the gradual shift. Generations I and I1  are 
not affected by this shift. On the other hand, each member of  generation I11 
now receives zero net benefits. Since generation IV and subsequent genera- 
tions pay a pension surtax of 0.8 in addition to the four units of the actuarially 
fair contribution to the pension fund, each member of these generations pays 
4.8 in  total per capita tax while receiving four units of  benefit. The figure 
clearly  shows that  the  shift mitigates  the  inequity of  income distribution 
among generations. 
Macro Balance. The dashed line in figure 7.8a shows that, when the system 
is reformed in period 3, national saving reaches five, equaling the level under 
the fully funded ~ystem.~  This level is higher than under the pay-as-you-go 
system but lower than under the switch to the fully funded. The reform re- 
duces the national dissaving in HAAP (period 4) to 4.6 from the level of five 
under the pay-as-you-go system. This is because the reform reduces the con- 
sumption of the baby boomer generation in this period more than it increases 
the consumption of the post-baby  boomer generation. The reform makes na- 
tional saving in period 5 lower than under the pay-as-you-go system. This is 
because the post-baby  boom generation now consumes more; it no longer has 
to support the baby boomers, who now finance their retirement consumption 
by the pension fund that they themselves have accumulated during their work- 
ing years. 
During periods 4-9,  saving under this regime is higher than under the pay- 
as-you-go system. The reason is that generations IV-IX  reduce their con- 
sumption to pay the pension surtax. We have seen that the negative cumulative 
balance of  saving remains permanently under the pay-as-you-go system as 
indicated by  the thick line in figure 7.8b. On the other hand, the dashed line 
in that figure shows that the level of  national debt is gradually reduced after 
the reform and reaches zero in period 9 under the gradual shift. This reduction 
essentially pays off  the consumption increase enjoyed by  generation I at the 
time the pay-as-you-go system was created. 
Thus, the gradual shift reduces the fluctuations of  national saving and the 
9.WehaveC; = Sfrom(8)andC; =  = 10andC = c+,  = 4.6for3<t9from(19) 
and(2).Thus,weobtainS3=20-  15=5,S,=  10- 14.6= -4.6,S,= 10-9.2= .8for 
4<r<9,S9= 10-9.6= .4,andS,=Ofor9<r. 228  Tatsuo Hatta and Noriyoshi Oguchi 
trade balance associated with the arrival of the HAAP but gives macro reper- 
cussions for a longer period than the reforms considered earlier. 
Budget Surplus. The dashed line in figure 7.6a shows the budget surplus.'O It 
takes a positive value in period 3, when the baby boomer generation is paying 
the pension tax. In period 4, when the baby boomers retire, the high level of 
benefit payments leads to negative government saving. But  the size of  the 
deficit is not quite as big as in the case of  pay-as-you-go because generation 
IV and subsequent generations are paying the pension surtax. The government 
surplus remains positive from period 5 through period 8 for the same reason. 
Figure 7.6b shows the process of accumulating the cumulative balance of the 
budget surplus to the steady-state level of the pension fund. 
7.3.3  Evaluation of Reform Plans 
Switching the pension  system to  fully funded before the  arrival of  the 
HAAP places an unusually high burden on the baby boom generation, creat- 
ing new inequity among generations. At the time of reform, it also creates a 
large national saving that even exceeds the amount that would take place if the 
system were fully funded from the beginning. Thus, this reform causes insta- 
bility both in distribution and in macro balance during the transition phase. 
We have examined two other reform plans that make the system actuarially 
fair eventually. Both will reduce intergenerational distributional inequity and 
labor disincentive problems associated with the current system, but neither 
creates the transitional problems. The switch to the actuarially fair system 
never builds up a cumulative government budget surplus to the level of social 
security wealth, while the gradual shift eventually builds up a cumulative bud- 
get surplus to that level. The choice between the two reforms should be made 
on the basis of macroeconomic considerations. 
In fact, the final target of the cumulative government surplus need not be 
limited to the level of either zero or the social security wealth. Any amount in 
between the two levels or even an amount above the social security wealth 
level will do. Gradually building up the cumulative budget surplus toward any 
such amount after first making the system actuarially fair will be more desir- 
able than  continuing the pay-as-you-go system or the  switch to  the fully 
funded, so  long as such a surplus is built up through a fair allocation of the 
pension surtax rates among different generations. 
So far we have assumed that the interest rate is zero. In the economy where 
the international interest rate is positive, switching the system to actuarially 
fair is critically different from the gradual shift to the fully funded in that the 
latter reduces the interest payment to foreign countries to zero when the re- 
10. The government  budget  surpluses  are  obtained  from  (18)  and (9): S!  = B, -  B, = 
4,Si=(B,+  .8)-B4=4.8-8=  -3.2,Sf=  .8 for4<r<9,andS:=Ofor8<f. 229  Public Pension Reform 
form is completed, whereas the former does not.  Even then,  however, the 
present value of the total income from foreign investments exactly matches 
the present value of the sum of the pension surtaxes collected to build up the 
budget surplus. Under both these reform plans, postreform generations are 
contributing at least an actuarially fair amount for their pension systems. The 
question here is how much surtax should be imposed on these generations to 
pay  off  the national debt caused by  the prereform generations, in  particular 
the first generation. This is not a problem specific to the pension reform, but 
it should be viewed as a type of the general optimal saving problem. 
7.4  Government Saving in the Agency View 
7.4.1  The Principal View versus the Agency View 
In the previous section, we defined the government budget surplus by  (9). 
Budget surplus (or deficit), however, is  “an inherently arbitrary accounting 
construct,” as Kotlikoff (1986, 53)  eloquently argues. Budget surplus or gov- 
ernment saving is more generally defined as follows: 
(20) 
What should be called government revenue or government expenditures is not 
unique. For example, depending on whether the social security contributions 
are treated as a tax or as private saving, the amount of  government revenue 
changes. 
The Principal View 
We  have so far regarded social security contributions as government tax 
revenue and benefit payments as government expenditures. Government sav- 
ing was equal to the difference between the social security contributions and 
benefits. Thus, the government was regarded as the saving principal rather 
than as an agent who simply manages the saving of the private sector. We will 
call this the principal view of government saving. When we refer to govern- 
ment saving or budget surplus later without qualifications, the concept will be 
in the principal view. 
The Agency View 
Alternatively, we may regard the social security system as a pension system 
that a government operates in lieu of  private pension funds. We  will call this 
the agency view of government saving since the government is viewed as an 
agent who manages the saving of the private sector. 
In  the  agency view,  the portion  of  the social security contribution that 
matches the expected future benefits is regarded as a premium for the pension, 
and hence private saving, but not as a tax. Thus, only the pension surtax (the 
Government saving = Government revenue 
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portion of social security contribution that exceeds the actuarially fair present 
value of  the expected benefits) is regarded as the tax  paid by  the working 
generation of  the given period. Similarly, the expected portion of the social 
security benefits may be regarded as the dissaving of the retirees in the pro- 
gram rather than as their income and government expenditure. Only the un- 
expected benefits paid in the given period may be regarded as the income of 
the retirees and a government expenditure in that period. The government 
saving in the agency view in a given period is, therefore, equal to the pension 
surtax paid by  the working generation minus the unexpected benefits paid to 
the retirees of the period. 
This view regards the government as managing an imaginary public pen- 
sion fund, from which the retiree withdraws benefits and to which the working 
generation makes actuarially fair contributions. We  will call this imaginary 
pension fund the Pension Fund, which is essentially an accounting concept. 
In the agency view, therefore, the government’s involvement with the pub- 
lic pension is twofold: (i) receiving (or making) a transfer from (to) each gen- 
eration and (ii) managing an  actuarially fair Pension Fund. We  will discuss 
the transfer between the government and the private sector in the rest of  this 
section and the Pension Fund in section 7.5. 
7.4.2  The Budget Surplus in the Agency View and Income Transfers 
We  can regard the income transfers between a person and the government 
through a pension system to be generated either at the time of his retirement 
or at the time he realizes that he can expect to receive benefits in the future. 
We  will call the former the postpaid version and the latter the prepaid version 
of the agency view. 
If  a pension system already exists, working-age people will expect to re- 
ceive benefits in their retirement. They plan their lifetime consumption in their 
youth after taking into account their total lifetime income, including the net 
income transfer. Thus, it is natural to consider that the net income transfer to 
members of this generation is already generated when they are in their work- 
ing years. In this paper, therefore, we adopt the prepaid version of the agency 
view. When we say simply the “agency view” without qualifications, we mean 
the prepaid version. 
Let us now decompose the benefit B, into the expected component & and 
the unexpected component B;. Thus, we have 
B, = B; + BY. 
In the agency view, B; is the income of the currently retired generation in the 
previous period and &the income of the same generation in this period. 
In the agency view, the government receives the tax revenue of T,  from the 
working generation in period t, while it pays this generation the transfer of 
Bg, , and the retired generation the transfer of B; in the same period. Letting 
sf denote the government saving in the agency view, therefore, we have 231  Public Pension Reform 
from (20). This represents the income transfer from the generations living in 
period t to the government that takes place in period 1. Thus, 3;  is a better 
measure of income transfer in period t than S; in that it measures the effect of 
the government pension activities in this period on the lifetime utility level of 
the generations living in this period, unlike the latter. 
Now assume that the public pension system is introduced in period 0 for the 
first time, by which we mean that none of the following happens before period 
0: (i) the working generation pays pension tax; (ii) future pension benefits of 
the currently working generation are announced; and (iii) the retired genera- 
tion receives unexpected benefit payments. Then we can define the cumulative 
balance of the government surplus in the agency view as 
(22)  2; =  J'j.  g 
Equations (21) and (22) yield the following: 
(23)  Zf  = [-B, + Z;-'(T, -  Bj+])]  + (T, - q+l). 
The term B, on the right-hand side represents the unexpected benefits by the 
retired generation in period 0. (This can of  course be zero.) This equation 
states that the cumulative government saving in the agency view equals the 
sum of  (a)  the cumulative income transfer to the government from all the 
generations older than the current working generation and (b) the pension sur- 
tax paid by the currently working generation. In this sense, the cumulative 
budget surplus in the agency view may be regarded as the cumulative transfer 
from the past and current generations to the future generations. 
Equation (23) can be rewritten to yield yet another interpretation of 2;: 
Thus, the cumulative budget surplus in the agency view  is the cumulative 
budget surplus in the principal view minus the expected benefit payment to 
the working generation in the given period. This difference is caused by the 
fact that the expected benefit payment is treated as the government expendi- 
ture of  this period in the agency view but as that of  the next period in the 
principal view. 
Note that, if the retired generation in period t  +  1 receives only expected 
benefits, equations (21), (23), and (24) become 
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If a system is actuarially fair in period t, for example, equations (21') and 
(6) yield 
(25)  s;  = 0. 
This is only natural since the government receives no transfers from the pri- 
vate sector in period t under the actuarially fair system. If the system is fully 
funded in period t, (24') and (1 1) yield 
(26)  Zf  = 0, 
implying that the government receives zero cumulative transfers from the pri- 
vate sector. 
If a pay-as-you-go system is introduced in period 2, the budget surpluses in 
both flow  and the cumulative balances are zero from (13) and (14). Thus, 
(24') implies 
f+l'  (27)  Z;=  -B 
This indicates that, under the pay-as-you-go system, the cumulative budget 
surplus in the agency view in a given period is equal to the social security 
wealth in that period. The variables Sf and Zf are depicted for the case of pay- 
as-you-go in figures 7.9a and 7.9b, based on (21') and (27), respectively. 
7.4.3  Effects of Reforms on Transfers between the Government and the 
Private Sector 
Under a pay-as-you-go system, therefore, the cumulative transfer from the 
government (i.e., the future generations) to the current and past generations is 
equal to the social security wealth of the current period. Thus, the cumulative 
transfer fluctuates as the economy passes through the HAAP. Our three reform 
plans may be viewed as different methods of managing this transfer and sta- 
bilizing its movements. 
To  examine how our three plans affect 3;  and 2;, the following proposition 
is useful. 
PROPOSITION  1. Suppose that a pay-as-you-go  public pension system is re- 
formed in period 3. Assume that under the reformed system all the pension 
benejits are announced prior to the payments and that taxes are still paid only 
by the working generations. Then the following holds: 
(28)  2; =  -B,  + E\(Z', -  B,,,),  t 2  3. 
Proof. Equation (23') implies 
2:  = Xi(T, -  B,) -  B, + X$",  -  BJ+l). 
Since the system satisfies B,  = T, for 0 5  j I  2, this yields the proposition. 
Q.E.D. 
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Fig. 7.9b  Cumulative budget surplus under the pay-as-you-go system 
working generations during periods 3 through t minus the benefits received by 
the retired in period  3. Note that this formula holds only if  the prereform 
pension system is pay as you go. An interpretation of this equation is straight- 
forward. Since the economy is under the pay-as-you-go system in period 2, 
the term -B, on the right-hand side of (28) is equal to the cumulative balance 
of the government saving in the agency view in period 3 from (27). In view of 
(21’), this balance is increased in each period by the amount of  the pension 
surtax. Thus, (28) indicates that the cumulative balance of government saving 
in the agency view  in period t is equal to the balance in period 2 plus the 
increase in the balance that took place after the reform. 
Switch to Fully Funded 
Suppose that the system is switched to fully funded in period 3. Then from 
(15) and proposition 1 we have 2;  = 0 for t 2 3. Thus, the cumulative bud- 234  Tatsuo Hatta and Noriyoshi Oguchi 
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system 
get surplus in  the agency view disappears immediately. The dashed line in 
figure 7.10b  shows this.  Also,  from (15) and  (21')  we have 35  = B,  and 
3:  = 0 for t 2  4. The dashed lines in figure 7.10a shows that a positive trans- 
fer to the government takes place in period 3. 
Switch to Actuarially Fair 
When the system is switched to actuarially fair in period 3, proposition 1 
and (17) imply 2; =  -B,  for t 2 3. Thus, the cumulative budget deficit in 
the agency view remains fixed at the level of the pension payment in period 3. 
The dashed line in figures 7.11b shows this. Also, from (17) and (21') we 
have 3:  = 0 for t 2  3.  The dashed lines in figures 7.1 la  shows this. 235  Public Pension Reform 
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system 
A  comparison of  figures  7.10a  and  7.11a  shows  that  the  budget  sur- 
pluses in the agency view between the two reform plans are different only in 
period 3. 
Gradual Shift to Fully Funded 
(18) and proposition 1 imply 
When the system is gradually shifted to fully funded starting in period 3, 
Z$= -B 3, 
Zf  =  -B,  + .8 Z;  N,, 
Zf  = 0, 
3 < t 5  8, 
8 5  t. 236  Tatsuo Hatta and Noriyoshi Oguchi 
The dashed line in figure 7.12b depicts the fluctuation 2;.  The cumulative 
budget surplus in the agency view, that is, the cumulative government transfer 
to the private sector, gradually diminishes until it reaches zero in period 8. 
The pension surtax spreads the burden of reducing the cumulative government 
transfer evenly among generations. 
On the other hand, (18) and (21’) imply 3%  = 0, 3;  = .8N, for 3 < t < 9, 
and 3;  = 0 for 9 I  t. The budget surplus in the agency view during periods 
4-8  reflects the pension surtax paid by the working generations of these peri- 
ods. The dashed line in figure 7.12a depicts the fluctuation of 3;. 
We  may sum up our observations here as follows. Under the pay-as-you-go 
system, the cumulative government transfer to the private sector (i.e., cumu- 
lative government saving in the agency view) in a given period is equal to the 
promised pension benefit payments to the working generation of that period. 
The switch to the fully funded eliminates this cumulative government transfer 
immediately. The switch to the actuarially fair keeps the cumulative balance 
fixed at the level of period 2. The gradual shift to the fully funded reduces the 
balance over time until it is eliminated. 
Each of the three reform plans smooths the fluctuations of  the cumulative 
government transfer after the reform. Not all the plans smooth the fluctuations 
of the government flow transfer after the reform, however. The switch to the 
fully funded requires a heavy transfer to the government in period 3. The other 
two reforms smooth the movement of the transfer in each period like that of 
the cumulative transfer. In planning a gradual building up of the cumulative 
budget surplus as in the gradual shift to the fully funded, the government can 
allocate the burden fairly among generations by  using the concept of the cu- 
mulative government deficit in the agency view. 
7.5  Pension Fund 
7.5.1  The Pension Fund and Pension Wealth 
Earlier, we  saw that,  in the agency view,  the government’s involvement 
with the public pension is twofold: receiving transfers from the private sector 
and managing the actuarially fair Pension Fund. We  turn now to the Pension 
Fund. 
The growth of the Pension Fund may be described as follows. In period t, 
the young generation contributes to the Fund by  B;,,, which is T, -  (T, - 
B:,  ,),I1  while the retired generation receives the benefit of B: from the Fund. 
Thus, the net increase of the Fund in this period, denoted AF,,  is 
(30)  AF,  = &+, - &. 
1 1. The social security tax T,  minus the pension surtax T, -  B;+, may be  equivalently expressed 
as the sum of the social security tax T,  and the transfer income that the young generation receives 
in this period, is.,  4,  I  - T,. 237  Public Pension Reform 
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Define the cumulative balance of the Pension Fund by 
(31)  F, = CbAFj, 
where it is assumed that the public pension system is introduced for the first 
time in period 0. From (30) and (31) and the fact that &j = 0, we have 
(32)  F, = B:,,,  t 2  0. 
Thus, the balance of the Pension Fund is always equal to the pension wealth 
B;, I . This holds whether the social security system is fully funded, pay as you 
go, or somewhere in between. 
Note that, if  the retired generation in period t  +  1 receives no unexpected 
benefits, equations (30) and (32) collapse to 238  Tatsuo Hatta and Noriyoshi Oguchi 
(30')  = B,,, -  B,, 
(32')  F,  = B,+,. 
These can easily be  computed from the population data. The identical thin 
lines in figures 7.9a, 7.10a, 7.1  la, and 7.12a depict the fluctuation of AF, if a 
per capita social security payment of  b is started in period 2. These lines are 
the same no matter how the benefits are actually financed. The identical thin 
lines in figures 7.9b, 7. lob, 7.1 lb, and 7.12b depict the fluctuation of F, for 
the same case. 
7.5.2  The Pension Fund and Government Saving 
How can the imaginary Pension Fund be funded? According to the follow- 
ing proposition, the growth (cumulative balance) of the Pension Fund can be 
financed by  the budget surplus (cumulative budget surplus) and the govern- 
ment transfer (cumulative government transfer) to the private sector. 
PROPOSITION  2. The increase in the Pension Fund has the following  relation 
with saving in the principal and agency views: 
(33)  AF,  = Sf - 3;  t > 1. 
The cumulative balances of each variable satisfy the following: 
(34)  F, = Zf -  Zf,  t > 1. 
Proof. From (9), (30), and (21), we observe (33). Thus, (10) and (31) yield 
(34). Alternatively, (34) can also be obtained from (24) and (32). Q.E.D. 
If a system is actuarially fair in period t,  proposition 2 and (25) imply 
(35)  AF,  = s;. 
Since the increase in the Pension Fund is equal to the budget surplus in this 
case, the lines for the increase in the Pension Fund in  figures 7.9a, 7.10a, 
7.1 la, and 7.12a are drawn identically to the line for the budget surplus for 
the fully funded system in figure 7.6a. If the system is fully funded in period 
t, (26) and proposition 2 immediately yield 
(36)  F, = Zf. 
In this case, therefore, the balance of the Pension Fund is equal to the cumu- 
lative budget surplus in the same period. Thus, the lines for the Pension Fund 
in figures 7.9b, 7.  lob, 7.1 lb, and 7.12b are identical to the lines for the cu- 
mulative budget saving for the fully funded system in figures 7.6a and 7.6b. 
As we observed earlier, an actuarially fair system in period t may not be fully 
funded in the same period. Thus, (35) does not necessarily imply (36). 
If a pay-as-you-go system is introduced in period 2, proposition 2 and (13) 
imply 
AF,  = -38.  (37)  0 239  Public Pension Reform 
hence, 
F  =  -ZK  (38)  I’ 
for all t > 1. Under a pay-as-you-go  system, therefore,  the increase in the 
Pension Fund in any given period is the mirror image of the government trans- 
fer to the private sector. Also, the balance of the Pension Fund is equal to the 
cumulative government transfer to the private sector under this system. Prop- 
osition 2 is illustrated for this case in figures 7.9a and 7.9b. 
Figure 7.10b shows that the  cumulative budget  surplus and  the  Pension 
Fund coincide when the cumulative government transfer disappears in period 
3.  Figures 7.1Oa-7.12b  illustrate proposition 2 for each tax reform plan. 
7.5.3  The Institutional Pension Fund 
The Pension Bond 
We  have seen that,  if  the system is fully funded in period  t, the Pension 
Fund is equal to the cumulative government surplus. Now  suppose that the 
system is not fully funded in period t;  hence, 
F, # Zf. 
Must the Pension Fund necessarily be imaginary in this case? The answer is 
no. The government can institutionally establish a Pension  Fund that has a 
balance equal to the pension wealth, F,, as long as it issues a government bond 
to finance the difference between F,  and 2;.  We will call this bond the pension 
bond and denote its balance by D,. By definition, we have 
(39)  D  I1  EF  -2;. 
In order to maintain the institutional Pension Fund after its establishment, 
the government has to adjust the outstanding balance of the pension bond in 
response to the gap between the Pension Fund and the cumulative saving in- 
creases. If the gap increases,  additional pension bonds must be issued; if  it 
decreases, some of the pension bonds must be redeemed. 
If the system is kept actuarially fair while the institutional Pension Fund is 
being maintained, the outstanding balance of the pension bond will stay con- 
stant from (35) and (39). No new bond  is issued and no outstanding bond 
redeemed. In this case, the cumulative balance of the budget surplus will fluc- 
tuate in parallel response to the balance of the Pension Fund. 
Even under  the pay-as-you-go  system the  government can institutionally 
establish a Pension Fund by issuing a pension bond to finance it. Since there 
is  no cumulative  budget  surplus  in  this  case from  (39), we have D, = F,; 
hence,  the balance of  the pension bond must be at the level of the Pension 
Fund itself. This and (20) yield 
(40)  D,  = BI,, 240  Tatsuo Hatta and Noriyoshi Oguchi 
Suppose that  the government  institutionally  establishes a Pension  Fund  by 
issuing the pension bond in period 2 while the system is still pay as you go. 
Then the switch to the fully funded system in period  3 would eliminate the 
outstanding balance of the pension bonds since the  switch would make the 
cumulative  balance  of  the  budget  surplus  exactly  equal  to the  balance  of 
the Fund. On the other hand, the switch to the actuarially fair system would 
not affect the outstanding balance of the pension bond at all since the switch 
keeps constant the difference between the cumulative balance of  the budget 
surplus and the balance of the Fund at the level of period 2. Finally, the grad- 
ual shift to the fully funded would not affect the outstanding balance of  the 
pension  bond  in  period  3 but  would  gradually reduce  it as the  cumulative 
balance of the budget surplus is built up to the level of the Pension Fund. 
Note that issuing the pension bond does not affect the government budget 
surplus or deficit at all. The budget deficit created by this bond exactly cancels 
out the increase in the budget surplus brought about by the establishment of 
the Fund. 
The Pension Bond and Government Saving in the Agency View 
The definition of D,  and (34) yield the following interpretation of the pen- 
sion bond. 
PROPOSITION  3. When the Pension Fund is institutionally maintained in period 
t, the balance of the outstanding pension bond is equal to the cumulative gov- 
ernment budget deficit in the agency view, that is, 
(41)  D,  =  -2:. 
Thus, the pension bond is nothing but the cumulative government deficit in 
the agency view. Issuing the pension bond at the time the institutional Pension 
Fund is created, therefore,  simply exposes the cumulative government deficit 
that already existed in the agency view at the time of issuing; it does not create 
a new government deficit even in the agency view.  Proposition 3 can also be 
viewed as giving an institutional interpretation to the government deficit in the 
agency view. 
Suppose that a pay-as-you-go pension system for which the Pension Fund 
has been institutionally established is reformed in period 3. Then from prop- 
ositions 1 and 3 the balance of the pension bond in period t is expressed as: 
j=3 
Since the economy is under the pay-as-you-go system in period 2, B3 on the 
right-hand side of (42) is the balance of the pension bond in period 2 from 
(40). In view of (41) and (21’), the bond is redeemed in each period by the 
amount of the pension surtax.  Thus, (42) indicates that the outstanding bal- 
ance of the pension bond in period  t is the outstanding balance in period 2 241  Public Pension Reform 
minus the cumulative redemption of the bond after the reform. Equation (42) 
gives an alternative explanation for the fluctuations of D, under various reform 
plans discussed earlier.’* 
Kotlikoff (1986, 57) called the social security wealth the “social security 
bond.” Equation (40) shows that, under a pay-as-you-go pension system, the 
pension bond is equal to the social security wealth in that period. As equation 
(39) shows, however, this equality does not generally hold under other pen- 
sion systems.I3 
Modijied Pension Reform Plans 
We  now consider issuing a bond  for a purpose different from that of  the 
pension bond. Suppose that a pay-as-you-go system is reformed in period 3 in 
the following manner. 
First, the government issues bonds in period 3 to finance the benefits of the 
retirees of this period. Second, the Pension Fund is institutionally established 
in period 3 and is maintained afterward. No less than actuarially fair taxes are 
imposed on generation I11 and subsequent generations to finance the Pension 
Fund. Third, the pension surtax, if positive, is used to redeem the bond. Since 
the tax revenue can be decomposed as T, = B,,  + (T, -  B,, J, the govern- 
ment can contribute B,,,  to the  Pension Fund and use the pension  surtax 
i”, - B,,  to redeem the pension bond. (Note that 5  -  B,,  2  0 by assump- 
tion.) 
The purpose of issuing the pension bond was to supplement the cumulative 
budget surplus in establishing and maintaining the Pension Fund institution- 
ally, and it could be issued in any period. On the other hand, the purpose of 
issuing a bond in the present reform proposal is to pay off  the benefit of the 
last contributor to the pay-as-you-go system through the revenue raised by the 
bond, thereby liquidating the pay-as-you-go system. Hence, we will call the 
bond the liquidation bond. Issuing this bond enables the government to estab- 
lish the Pension Fund from scratch by financing it with the tax revenues from 
the postreform generations. We will call such a pension reform a reform plan 
through liquidation bond. 
Each of  our three reform plans has its counterpart among the reform plans 
through  liquidation bond.  Suppose that  the  government issues liquidation 
bonds in period 3 to finance the benefits of the retirees of this period and then 
imposes taxes on generation I11 and subsequent generations at the same rates 
as each of the three reform plans does. Since none of  the three modified re- 
form plans imposes a negative pension surtax, the tax revenue can institution- 
12. If  the system is switched to actuarially fair, e.g.,  (42) implies that D, = B, holds for all 
t 2 3; the pension bond is maintained constant at the level of B,. If the system is gradually shifted 
to fully funded, D,  = E, - .8 &V,  holds for 3 < t 5 8 and D,  = 0 for 8  t, eventually elim- 
inating the pension bond. 
13. Note that Kotlikoffs concept of social security wealth is the postpaid notion, while ours is 
the prepaid notion. But (24)  can also be established for the postpaid notions of 2; and B;+ ,  . 242  Tatsuo Hatta and Noriyoshi Oguchi 
ally finance the Pension Fund in each case. The pension surtaxes, if positive, 
are used to redeem the liquidation bond. We thus obtain reform plans through 
liquidation bond that are counterparts to our three reform plans. Since the tax 
and benefit structures of each of our pension reform plans and their counter- 
parts in the reform through liquidation bond are identical, their real effects on 
the economy are identical. 
Moreover, the outstanding balance of the liquidation bond in a given period 
would be identical to the outstanding balance of the pension bond had it been 
issued instead. The amount of the liquidation bond issued in period 3 is B3, 
while the total amount of redemption is represented by  the summation of the 
pension surtaxes paid by the postreform generations, c(T,  -  Bj+,).  By con- 
struction, therefore, we can write the outstanding balance of the liquidation 
bond in period t as 
I 
j=  3 
LI = B, - C(Tj - 
j=3 
This and (28) immediately show that 
(45)  L, = z;  t 2  3. 
Thus, the liquidation bond may be viewed as yet another interpretation of the 
government saving in the agency view. Equations (44) and (42) also show that 
L, = D,,  t 2  3. 
Thus, the liquidation bond may  also be  viewed as an interpretation of  the 
pension bond. 
Incidentally, the amount of the liquidation bond issued in period 3 is equal 
to the amount of the benefits received by generation I since generations I and 
I1 receive the same net benefits from the pay-as-you-go system in our numer- 
ical setting. Thus, the implicit government deficit that the liquidation bond 
brings out is the one created by the free-ride benefit that generation I received 
at the time the pay-as-you-go system was implemented in period 1. 
Finally, note that our interpretation of the cumulative government saving in 
the agency view in terms of pension bond and liquidation bond given by prop- 
osition 3 and (45) depends crucially on the particular definition of government 
saving we  adopted here: the prepaid version of  the agency view.  If  we had 
adopted the postpaid version, proposition 3 and (45) would not hold unless 
the definition of the Pension Fund were similarly adjusted. 
7.5.4  Summary 
In  this section, we have observed the following. First, an  actuarially fair 
pension system in a given period can be interpreted as the one where the gov- 243  Public Pension Reform 
ernment transfer to the private sector in the agency view is zero in that period, 
while a fully funded system in the given period can be interpreted as the one 
where the cumulative government transfer in the agency view to the private 
sector is zero. 
Second, all three reform plans we discussed inherit the cumulative govern- 
ment transfer to the private sector from the pay-as-you-go system. The switch 
to an actuarially fair system carries it over forever to the future. The gradual 
shift to the fully funded system reduces this cumulative government transfer 
in the long run. The switch to the fully funded system immediately eliminates 
this cumulative transfer in the period of reform. 
Third, according to proposition 2, the net increase in the Pension Fund is 
financed by the budget surplus and the government transfer to the private sec- 
tor. The Pension Fund is an accounting concept, but it can be institutionally 
established by issuing the pension bond. 
Fourth, according to proposition 3, the outstanding amount of the pension 
bond is equal to the cumulative balance of the transfer from the private sector 
to the government by that period. Hence, the net increase in the Pension Fund 
may be viewed as being financed by  budget surplus and by the new issue of 
pension bonds. 
Fifth, Kotlikoffs “social security bond” is the equivalent of  our pension 
bond under a pay-as-you-go system, but that is not generally the case under 
different pension systems. 
Sixth, the gradual shift to the fully funded may be carried out by issuing a 
liquidation bond. The amount of  this bond  issued in the first period of  the 
reform is exactly equal to the cumulative balance of the government transfer 
to the private sector that was implicit under the pay-as-you-go system in the 
period immediately before the reform. 
Seventh, the concept of the cumulative government transfer to the private 
sector is useful in planning the tax policy to distribute the burden of institu- 
tional building up the Pension Fund among generations fairly. 
7.6  Concluding Remarks 
In the present paper, we have observed the following. First, the fact that the 
Japanese social security system is pay as you go creates problems with respect 
to both distribution and efficiency. In particular, it places a heavy burden on 
the post-baby  boom generation by  transferring income from it to the baby 
boom generation. 
Second,  switching the system to the fully funded one in one generation 
shifts the heavy burden to the baby boom generation. Also, it will make the 
national saving in the switching period even larger than what would be at- 
tained if the system were fully funded from the beginning. 
Third, a switch to an actuarially fair but unfunded system eliminates mi- 
croeconomic problems of the Japanese social security system without causing 
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Fourth, if  the accumulation of  cumulative budget surplus is necessary to 
make the system fully funded from a macroeconomic point of  view, it can be 
done by first changing the system into an actuarially fair but unfunded one and 
then gradually building up the fund by  taxing several generations. Economic 
effects of such a gradual shift were analyzed. 
Fifth, a few different interpretations of  the cumulative balance of  govern- 
ment deficit in the agency view were given. It was interpreted as the transfer 
from future generations to the present and past generations. It was also inter- 
preted as the pension bond necessary to supplement the cumulative budget 
surplus in establishing the Pension Fund institutionally. The outstanding bal- 
ance of this bond is zero when the system is fully funded, while it is equal to 
the social security wealth when the system is pay  as you  go. A systematic 
reduction of  the outstanding amount of this bond enables the government to 
spread the burden of building up the fund evenly among several generations. 
Moreover, the cumulative balance of  government deficit in the agency view 
was shown to be equal to the outstanding balance of  the liquidation bond if 
the pension reform is carried out by issuing the liquidation bond. 
Although the merits of the fully funded system are well known, economists 
are usually apprehensive about switching an existing pay-as-you-go system to 
the fully funded one because it creates instability in  both distribution and 
macro balance in the transition phase. It is not necessary, however, to accu- 
mulate the budget surplus for the purpose of eliminating the distributional and 
efficiency problems associated with the pay-as-you-go system like the current 
Japanese social security system. A switch to an actuarially fair but unfunded 
system attains this objective. 
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Comment  Edward P.  Lazear 
This was  an excellent paper. I was impressed by  the clarity of  thought and 
exposition, and I learned a great deal by reading it. I recommend it to you. It 
is a very nice model for tracing out the effects of various funding schemes on 
savings, government deficits, and trade balances. 
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I must confess to having a real soft spot for simplicity. The words “simple 
model” are overused. Almost every author calls his model simple. This one 
really is, but it gets to the essence of  what the authors want to discuss. In 
particular, it does an excellent job of exposing what is real and what is illu- 
sory, that is, what is truly of  economic significance and what is merely ac- 
counting. 
I view it as a starting point for thinking about these problems. In order to 
start, it is important to know the effects of the different funding patterns on the 
key  driving variables. Thus, knowing the effect on the driving variables of 
changing from a pay-as-you-go funding system to a fully funded one is essen- 
tial before we can ask some bigger questions. What I would like to do is 
address some of  the big questions that I believe are not yet  covered in this 
paper. I see these as extensions of the current work, but I believe that some 
are very important extensions that should be undertaken so that we can under- 
stand the significance of  the effects that Tatsuo Hatta and Noriyoshi Oguchi 
are tracing out. 
The main shortcoming of the paper to my  mind is that it focuses a bit too 
heavily on accounting and ignores economic behavior. To  put it most gener- 
ally, there is no way in the current model to evaluate which scheme is best. 
While the model does an excellent job of tracing out the savings and consump- 
tion patterns of the different generations under the two scenarios, the authors 
do not attempt to analyze which is better. In fact, they cannot perform that 
analysis in the current model because savings plays no role in a macroeco- 
nomic sense. Let me be a bit more specific. 
In the model, there is no effect of current consumption and therefore sav- 
ings on future income. The investment side of the problem is not modeled. I 
will return to this point later, but the main idea here is that intergenerational 
savings does not perform a useful function as it does in the traditional overlap- 
ping generation models or as it does in the newer increasing-returns-based 
growth models. Specifically, a fully funded pension scheme does not result in 
a different flow of total income over time from the pay-as-you-go system. But 
pay as you go yields a different pattern of savings than a fully funded system. 
In a closed economy, one might expect this to make a difference to the income 
path because it affects capital accumulation, and the differences might carry 
over to an open economy as well. 
One obvious possibility is that changes in savings over time may have very 
different efficiency effects because the different tax rates and structures may 
imply different distortions. Any distortionary effects of  the tax changes are 
ignored in the current model. 
Even ignoring issues of  capital accumulation, the pay-as-you-go scheme 
implies a different distribution of income and consumption than does the fully 
funded one. There is no way  to evaluate the two different approaches, how- 
ever. Because the analysis is not embedded in a maximizing framework, one 
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while the  switch from pay  as you go to fully funded seems to work in this 
context, there is no way to make any welfare judgment about the switch. In 
the pay-as-you-go scheme, the post-baby  boom generation gets hit badly, and 
a switch to fully funded evens this out. But depending on the nature of inter- 
generational transfers and altruism,  this  could  have either beneficial,  detri- 
mental, or no effects on utility. 
Investment is not modeled in the current discussion. This leaves us begging 
for more because investment may have a life of  its own. While this will not be 
true in a closed economy, the discussion in this paper is explicit in thinking of 
Japan as an open economy. Reference to trade surpluses and deficits are found 
throughout. 
Others have looked at the relation of  savings to investment.  Feldstein  in 
particular has argued that savings and investment are not as independent as 
they should be in a perfect capital market open economy. But this does not 
mean that they are the same. 
The point  is best  seen  by  comparing  the  United  States and  Japan.  The 
United States is currently running a trade deficit. Hatta and Oguchi say that a 
high savings rate and large trade surplus are inevitable when the baby boom 
generation is in its working years. This does not fit the United States. While 
we are not aging as quickly as Japan, the difference results  from relatively 
high levels of investment in the  United  States that are financed by  foreign 
savings. And we have a negative trade balance. In the open economy context, 
the  difference  between  savings and investment  is an important one, which 
might be discussed in the current paper. 
To make another general point, the government is modeled in two ways in 
this paper, what the authors call the principal view and the agency view. These 
analyses were informative, but they could be extended. In particular, there is 
no discussion of other sources of government revenue and other areas of ex- 
penditure. This may be a useful approximation, but I think that it is problem- 
atic. There is evidence for the United States, compiled by John Cogan, that 
reveals that the trend has been to raise trust fund revenues against general fund 
revenues.’ Cogan finds that during the postwar period  there is a dollar-for- 
dollar substitution of trust fund for general fund revenue relative to GNP. This 
suggests that, if  Japan changes the  structure of social  security funding,  we 
may expect a corresponding  change in other aspects of  the tax structure.  If 
this kind  of substitution occurs, a change in the funding structure may not 
alter government receipts the way the model predicts. 
A related question arises. Even if there is no corresponding cutback in other 
sources of government revenues, will social security funding be dedicated to 
expenditures on social security payments, or will it generate an expansion in 
1. See John F. Cogan, “The Federal Deficit in the 1990s:  A Tale of Two  Budgets,” in Thinking 
about America: The UniredSrures in rhe 1990s, ed. Annelise Anderson and Dennis L. Bark (Stan- 
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other kinds of government expenditure so that the post-baby  boom generation 
is left in almost the same shape as it would have been had the switch in fund- 
ing not occurred? 
To  make one final point, there is no discussion of the effects of  government 
savings  on private  savings.  Assumptions  about the displacement of private 
savings by  government  savings should be  made explicit because  this  is an 
important part of the controversy over any funding plan. 
In sum, this is an excellent paper that allows us to begin to think about some 
of the related big questions. It is a first step, and without it we would have had 
no hope of thinking about the other issues that I have discussed in any system- 
atic way. 